Three False Armistice Cablegrams from France

By Thursday 7 November 1918, separate armistice agreements had already stopped the fighting between the Allies and Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey – the countries aligned with Germany.  And during that day, German delegates were making their way to the Western Front to conclude an armistice between Germany and the Allies – eventually signed on Monday 11 November 1918. 1 ENDNOTES

The delegates reached the Front during late evening on 7 November, but hours before their arrival misinformation was released in Paris that an armistice had been signed with Germany: the false German armistice news of 7 November 1918.

Initially, the news spread around France and to Britain and the USA.  From the USA it crossed into Canada, Mexico and other parts of Latin America, and from Canada reached Australia and New Zealand.

This is an account of how the false armistice news entered Britain and the USA in three distinct dispatches from American sources, two of which went to the USA, the other to Britain.  US officials in Paris sent reports to Washington, DC, about the dispatches to the USA, and these reports are also discussed here.

(Four other false armistice cablegrams which were allegedly sent by Paris officials to Washington, DC, on 7 November 1918 are discussed elsewhere on this website. 23)

[Note: The time of the day in Britain was the same as in France in November 1918.  In the United States, Washington, DC, time – Eastern Standard Time – was five hours behind British and French time.  German time was one hour ahead of the time in France. Thus, 11:00 am in Britain was 11:00 am in France, 6:00 am in Washington DC, and 12 midday in Germany.]

a) The two cablegrams to the United States

Of the two false German-armistice cablegrams sent to the USA on 7 November 1918, one went to Washington, DC, the other to New York City.  Both arrived before midday.  The first was from Major B. H. Warburton, the Military Attaché at the American Embassy in Paris.  The other was from Roy W. Howard, president of the United Press news agency.

Major Warburton sent his dispatch to the War Department in Washington, DC, by military wire.  It read simply “Armistice signed”, and arrived at 8:55 am local time, which was 1:55 pm French time. 2  Unfortunately, neither this nor other cables Warburton sent on 7 and 8 November show the time of transmission from Paris.  However, at 1:00 pm in Paris on 7 November Warburton told Colonel Cabot Ward, Assistant Chief of Staff of G-2 (SOS), that he had sent it “during the morning”. 3

It would have taken about 10 minutes for the cable to reach the War Department from Paris by a so-called “war-time system of quick communication”. 4  If it had been in a transmission queue, it could have taken much longer.

From the War Department – at “about 10 o’clock” – the head of the Military Intelligence Division, Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, personally delivered a “secret copy” of Warburton’s message to the State Department.  Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March, and foreign policy adviser Frank Polk all agreed that it must be a mistake.  They reasoned accurately that, as the German delegates had left Berlin for the Western Front (hundreds of miles away) only the previous afternoon, “it was physically impossible for [them] to have [already] reached the French lines and much less to have conferred with Marshal Foch”.

But to be certain, Edward House, President Woodrow Wilson’s Special Representative in Paris, was asked “for confirmation or denial” of the news.5   The request carries the time “11 a.m.” from the State Department.  Apparently, it “got through to the embassy … in nine minutes” and so would have arrived there sometime after about 4:10 pm French time.  House’s reply denied the armistice news – the German delegates, he remarked, were not due to meet Marshal Foch until 5 o’clock that afternoon.  The State Department received the reply at 2:04 pm. 6

However, at 12:25 pm – almost two hours before House’s reply arrived at the State Department – the War Department received a follow-on cablegram from Major Warburton cancelling his “Armistice signed” message.  Warburton explained that a Major Straight (US liaison officer presumably) had telephoned a denial of the armistice news from Marshal Foch’s headquarters (in Senlis) and noted that the German delegates were due to arrive at 5 o’clock that afternoon. 7  The State Department was informed, and sometime after 12:45 pm, Polk handed a copy of Warburton’s follow-on message to Lansing at a club where the Secretary of State was having lunch. 8

While this was taking place in Washington, DC, the armistice cablegram sent by Roy Howard had arrived in New York City (some 300 miles away) just before midday local time, 5:00 pm French time.

Its peace message was sent originally from Paris supposedly by Captain R. H. Jackson, the American Naval Attaché at the American Embassy, to Admiral Henry B. Wilson, commander of US naval forces in France.  It also travelled by military wire, sometime before 4:00 pm (French time) to the Admiral’s headquarters in the port of Brest on the Brittany peninsula.  Naming the French Foreign Office as its source, the message stated that the Allies and Germany had signed an armistice at “eleven this morning”, that “hostilities ceased [at] two this afternoon”, and, also erroneously, that the city of Sedan had been “taken this morning” by American forces. 9

Brest Navy Headquarters seem to have forwarded the peace news to the Navy Department in Washington, DC. 24 And shortly after 4:00 pm, Admiral Wilson released it to the townspeople in Brest, who immediately began to celebrate the end of the war.  He also gave a copy of it to Roy Howard who by coincidence was in Brest waiting for a ship back to America.

Howard sent the news to the United Press office in New York City by trans-Atlantic cablegram directly from Brest.  It was transmitted around 4:20 pm and left without prior clearance from the French cable censors there, arriving at the United Press office in the Pulitzer Building on Park Row not long before noon, local time.  The New York censors believed Howard had sent the message from the United Press office in Paris (rather than somewhere else) and that the French censors had already cleared it.  They therefore cleared it and allowed United Press to send it “on the leased wires of the service … to all parts of the country”.  Within a very short time, “the nation was aflame, and started a celebration that was never halted until after the real signing of the armistice”. 10

Although Howard became increasingly aware that the armistice news might not be true, he delayed telling the New York City office until late on 7 November, in an ‘armistice unconfirmable’ cablegram which they received the following day – 8 November – around 11:30 am. 11

(Intriguingly, Special Representative House and Admiral Wilson are alleged to have sent ‘armistice-signed’ and follow-on cancellation cablegrams of their own on 7 November.) 23

b) The cablegram to Britain

Unfortunately, there seems to be little available information concerning the false armistice cablegram that went to Britain.  

It arrived at the American Embassy in London sometime before 4:00 pm on 7 November.  Presumably travelling by uncensored military telegraph, most probably from Paris, it announced simply that an armistice with Germany had been signed at 2:30 that afternoon.

Who sent the news is unknown, but US Navy personnel in the Embassy buildings apparently received it initially.  Who released the information to the British is also unknown. 12a  But he passed it on to the Reuters news agency in London which made it available to newspapers just before 4:00 pm in a short bulletin describing it as “official American information”.  As the time in Britain was the same as in France in November 1918, the false armistice news therefore arrived and began spreading in Britain before Roy Howard’s cablegram had left Brest for New York City.

Reuters did not submit its armistice bulletin to the British press censors before sending it out. Within minutes, however, it was informed – perhaps by the American Embassy or British Foreign Office – that the news was unconfirmed.  The agency immediately withdrew it, but this failed – for several hours – to stop its amazingly rapid spread across England, Wales and Scotland. 12b

Of the three false armistice cablegrams, only Major Warburton’s reported the false armistice news that began circulating in Paris during late morning on 7 November; the other two transmitted false armistice news that arose a few hours later during the afternoon. 25 Roy Howard’s is the most well-known.  It achieved immediate notoriety in American newspapers outside the United Press syndicate, was the main focus of many writings about the False Armistice after 1918 and is mentioned, often in relation to ‘fake news’, in online ‘blogs’.  Major Warburton’s cablegram, effectively contained within the War and State Departments on 7 November 1918, was not revealed to the public until many years later and is still relatively unknown even in the United States. 13  The cablegram that took the false armistice news to Britain was very quickly forgotten about, as were the events it helped to generate there.

The State and War Departments subsequently telegraphed Paris demanding to know how the armistice misinformation had escaped the censors and got through to the United States.  And the Navy Department demanded an explanation from Admiral Wilson in Brest about Roy Howard’s cablegram.  Whether enquiries were made as to how the false news reached Britain, is not known.  No evidence of any has been found for this article.

The State Department Demands Explanations

With false armistice news released by United Press racing around the United States, Secretary of State Lansing demanded to know why it had not been contained in France.  As yet unaware that Roy Howard had sent the news from Brest, he had the following telegram, its text evidently restrained, sent to the American Ambassador in Paris, William Sharp:

“United Press [in New York City] received telegram today before 1 p.m. announcing armistice had been signed.  Telegram published at once and greatest excitement and enthusiasm prevails.  This Department and War Department have been informed no foundation for story.  Please find out why censor passed this report as the incident is most unfortunate.” 14

At the same time, he had a separate cable sent to Special Representative House.  Its longer message, less restrained, presumed some sharp practice on the part of the news agency:

“United Press received telegram this morning which was published at once announcing armistice had been signed.  Later information from War Department and from you is that there is no foundation for report.  Similar report was received early this morning by War Department from Warburton but not credited.  The effect of publication of news naturally has created tremendous excitement. People marching through streets cheering peace.  If as you report there is no foundation for report, it would seem a grave error has been made by censor in permitting this message to pass and that the United Press has been guilty of reckless news work.  Please have Embassy investigate and report how United Press has made such a serious mistake.” 15

Judging from what Lansing recorded having reported to President Wilson about the armistice news, the State and War Departments decided that French and British censors must be to blame for its arrival in America.  For in a memorandum written the same day, he wrote that he told the President the French and British “had permitted the press telegram to come through” – what he described as “a strange neglect of duty”.  He did not say, however, on what evidence he based his assertion.16

The Explanations from Sharp and House

Ambassador Sharp’s report to the State Department arrived in two parts, during Friday 8 and Saturday 9 November.

In the first part, the Ambassador explained:

“Preliminary investigation shows that the telegram referred to was filed in Brest by Mr. Roy Howard head of the United Press who is now at that Port enroute to the United States.  The telegram was passed by the American authorities at Brest.  Will cable you when further investigation shows where responsibility lies.”

In the second part, which arrived on Saturday, he added:

“Paris representative of United Press states that he has been in communication telephone with Mr. Howard at Brest who informs him that Admiral Wilson, having received a telegram from the Naval Attaché at the Embassy that armistice had been signed, gave out the news to the local press at Brest, also to Mr. Howard; the latter accompanied by one of Admiral Wilson’s aides filed the cable to the United States which was passed by the censor.” 17

Special Representative House reported that his information coincided with the Embassy’s.  He explained:

“Most of the officials in Paris and practically every non-official person here believed yesterday that the armistice had been signed.  Captain Jackson, Naval Attaché at the Embassy, sent Admiral Wilson at Brest a wire to that effect.  Wilson showed wire to Roy Howard at Brest and sent an aide with him to cable censor so that Howard would be permitted to send through a dispatch stating that the armistice had been signed.  It is perfectly clear that United Press was not at fault in this matter and that the fault if any, lies with Jackson or the French official who started the rumor….” 18

Clearly, Lansing’s assumptions about British and French censors in France neglecting their duties, and of  “reckless news work” there by United Press were not borne out by Sharp’s and House’s reports.  On the contrary, they absolved United Press and Roy Howard of any wrongdoing, while insinuating that it was American authorities, in Paris and Brest, that were responsible for what Lansing had termed the “grave error” and “serious mistake” of allowing the armistice news to spread.

The War Department Demands an Explanation from Warburton

In the follow-on message cancelling his armistice news on 7 November, Warburton had claimed – without elaboration – that the “Armistice signed” information had been confirmed by “G-2 (?) S.O.S., Paris”. 19

The following day, Friday 8 November, Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill demanded an explanation from him.  Evidently annoyed, the General instructed him to:

“… explain fully the circumstances which led you to make the unqualified statement that the armistice had been signed, based merely on the authority of G-2, S.O.S., as stated in your No. 629.  Rush answer.” 20

Warburton replied the same day.  He now told Churchill he had received the (late morning) news from the American Embassy; but repeated his claim that G-2 (SOS) had confirmed it:

“[The] information was furnished me by embassy, as I thought, officially.  Subsequently after having sent my [“Armistice signed” cable] embassy, to my astonishment, asked me if [armistice] report had been confirmed.  Immediately upon discovery of my error endeavored to secure confirmation, which was obtained from Lt. Col. Ward, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, S.O.S., who stated at 1:00 P.M. that French War Office had called him by telephone and confirmed report and had requested him to notify our General Headquarters.  This report was given absolute credence by various departments of French government and was not officially denied until the afternoon and at the same time this office sent you cable No. 629 [his follow-on cancellation message].”

He concluded his explanation with the following somewhat vague comment:

“Probable reason for universal belief of [armistice] report was no doubt caused by interception of wireless message ordering cessation of fire yesterday afternoon (November 7.) to permit the plenipotentiaries to cross lines.” 21

With no other information to clarify it, the War Department may not immediately have comprehended what Warburton meant by his last sentence.  But he was stating, in effect, that  everyone in Paris believed the armistice news on 7 November because an intercepted wireless message contained an order for a cease-fire that afternoon to enable the German armistice delegates to cross the front lines.

Major Warburton thus named the American Embassy, Colonel Cabot Ward of G-2 (SOS) in Paris, and various French government departments as having either spread or confirmed the morning armistice news.  And he affirmed that everyone believed the news because of an intercepted wireless message about an afternoon cease-fire on 7 November for the German plenipotentiaries.  What he did not explain, however, was whose wireless message was intercepted, when it was intercepted and by whom, at what time the afternoon cease-fire was to begin, and why the message itself should lead people to believe an armistice with Germany had been concluded.  (See the addendum below about Major Warburton and Colonel Cabot Ward.)

Warburton’s information added a little to what Ambassador Sharp and Special Representative House had reported.  But only House attempted to identify where the ‘armistice-signed’ news originated – with some “French official” he claimed had “started the rumor”.  After this, the State and War Departments seem to have made no further demands for other details or clarifications about the false armistice news. However, at least one other report about it was produced at the time – by the American Army G-2 (SOS) Intelligence Service in Paris during 7-9 November – which carried out its own investigation into why the false news had started and how it had spread.  And its findings were far more detailed than those sent in the above three reports to the State and War Departments. 22

The Navy Department Demands an Explanation from Admiral Wilson

The Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, telegraphed Admiral Wilson in Brest on 8 November wanting to know whether he was responsible for releasing the false armistice news there the previous day.  In his reply, Wilson explained that he had announced the news, which he assumed to be official as it was sent by the Naval Attaché in Paris, and had given a copy of it to Roy Howard.  He denied, however, that he gave Howard permission to send the news to the United States and had helped him with its transmission (allegations made in Ambassador Sharp’s and Special Representative House’s reports to the State Department, and later by Roy Howard in his account of 7 November events in Brest). 26

Developments leading towards the real armistice on 11 November very quickly overshadowed the False Armistice, but in the United States – unlike elsewhere – did not completely submerge it.  For many years after the war ended, American newspapers retained a particular interest in the story of Roy Howard and his 7 November armistice cablegram from Brest.

Addendum: Colonel Cabot Ward and Major Barclay H. Warburton

Major Warburton, who sent the first false armistice cable to the United States on 7 November 1918, claimed twice that the G-2 (SOS ) Assistant Chief of Staff in Paris, Colonel Cabot Ward, actually confirmed the news to him when they spoke about it at 1:00 pm that day (by telephone presumably).

He informed General Marlborough Churchill at the War Department in Washington, DC, that Ward told him the French War Ministry had confirmed the armistice news by telephone, and that he had reported it to the American Army’s General Headquarters.  A denial of the news, Warburton stated, came to him later in the afternoon from a Major Straight at Marshal Foch’s Headquarters.

However, Warburton’s explanation to General Churchill completely contradicts what the G-2 (SOS) Report maintains throughout – that from the beginning Ward and his office treated the armistice news “cautiously” and “answered all inquiries” about it with warnings that it could not be trusted.

Different Sections of the Report record that:

  • G-2 (SOS) in Paris had not been able to obtain confirmation of the armistice news from the French Second Bureau.
  • Ward felt “it was incredible that [the news], however authenticated, could be correct”.
  • Around midday, he informed US Army GHQ, “with all reserve” that the French Ministry of War had announced a 10:00 am signing of the German armistice.
  • The same warning was given to SOS Headquarters in Tours.
  • G-2 (SOS) “answered all inquiries by stating that the Chief of the French 2d Bureau and the representatives of Marshal Foch in Paris both refused to confirm the rumor”.
  • The “Intelligence representatives at G.H.Q. and in Paris answered all inquiries by stating that it was a rumor that should be taken with the greatest caution”.

[False Report of Signing of Armistice, Sections 2,3,9,10.]

Ward did not record in the Report what he said to Major Warburton, only what Warburton said to him.  Nevertheless, on balance, it seems unlikely that he would have told Warburton at 1:00 pm on 7 November that the armistice news had been confirmed – in other words, that it was true.

It seems more likely that Warburton misunderstood or recalled incorrectly what he claimed Ward told him, and had taken the information about the French War Ministry to mean that its armistice announcement was accepted by Ward as official verification, rather than as information to be treated with reserve.

Drawing from Section 3 of the Report, historian John Toland wrote that the armistice news “reached” Major Warburton “at 1 P.M.” on Thursday 7 November.  [John Toland, No Man’s Land: The Story of 1918. (London. 1980.) In Chapter 15, ‘The False Armistice’, p548.]

But Section 3 actually says that “at one o’clock” that afternoon Warburton told Ward he had received authentic information about the armistice-signing and sent his “Armistice signed” cable to Washington “during the morning”.  And he told General Churchill that he spoke to Ward at one o’clock on Thursday afternoon about armistice news he had received earlier from the Embassy.

[False Report of Signing of Armistice, Section 3]

In correspondence about a separate matter, Secretary of State Lansing warned Edward House, President Wilson’s Special Representative in Paris, that Warburton – a “nice man but not discreet” –  did not have the “full confidence of military intelligence” at the War Department.  “Strongly” advising him “to be very careful with Warburton”, Lansing told House it would be “better all around if you did not take him into your confidence”.

Lansing made these “absolutely confidential” comments in response to a cable in which House, commending Warburton for providing “a great deal of assistance to us” and taking “no end of trouble in our behalf”, had confided that “we have given him certain information respecting negotiations of the past week” on condition that he did not report it to “the military intelligence in Washington”.

Apparently, “negotiations of the past week” referred to recent discussions in the Allied Supreme War Council (based in Versailles), and General Churchill, head of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, had been demanding information about the discussions from Warburton, who was helping General Tasker H. Bliss, the US military representative on the Council.

House, however, did not want Warburton to pass the information on to Churchill.  And he asked Lansing to explain to Churchill that he expected the latter to obtain “all information of this character” from President Wilson.  The discouraging comments about the Military Attaché, presumably influenced by the War Department, followed not long afterwards.

House must have been taken aback by them.  He agreed to “carefully” follow the Secretary of State’s advice, confiding that he had “no illusions with respect to this man”.  Changing tone, the President’s Special Representative now asserted that Warburton had been given “no information of any value whatever”, and that his “service to us” had been only “in many minor matters”.

[‘Edward House to Secretary of State. Number 52. November 6, 1918, 4pm.’ File# 121.54/1718; ‘Lansing to House. Number 17. Special Cipher. November 7, 1918.’ File# 121.54/1718; ‘Edward House to Lansing. Number 65. November 8, 1918. 7 p.m.’ [Page 2, in response to Lansing’s number 17.] File# 763.72119/9100. Department of State Records, Record Group 84, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.]

After the war, Major Warburton received the Army Distinguished Service Medal for his work as Military Attaché in Paris and for rendering “invaluable assistance and conspicuous service to the military representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council”.  Following his return from France, he served for a time as Director of the Philadelphia Public Welfare Department and was appointed (unpaid) Special Police Commissioner for Philadelphia in August 1921.  During 1928-1930 he was mayor of Palm Beach, Florida.  He died in December 1954.

[Hall of Valor. Military Times. ‘Valor Awards for Barclay H. Warburton’; The New York Times13 August 1921 ; the Gettysburg Times7 December 1954, p8; J.P. Webster, The Philadelphia State Hospital at Byberry. (Charleston. 2013).]

Lieutenant Colonel Cabot Ward, “United States Army Air Service”, received the Army Distinguished Service Medal for his work as “Assistant Chief of Staff, in charge of the Intelligence Section of the Services of Supply”, with particular reference to “the important task of counterespionage throughout the American Expeditionary Forces and in the neighboring neutral countries”.  He remained with the US Intelligence Service in France until June 1919.  He became a Commander of the French Legion of Honour and was awarded the British Distinguished Service Order.  He died in May 1936, and is buried at Menton, in south-east France.

[Hall of Valor. Military Times. ‘Valor Awards for Cabot Ward’. Burial information from: Cimetière du Vieux Château. Menton. Département des Alpes-Maritimes. ‘Memorial ID, 160903996’.]

© James Smith   (Revised August 2020)


A) United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919. Volume 10. Part 1. The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents. Center Of Military History, United States Army. (Washington, DC, 1948; 1991) [Online]

B) Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs. Military Intelligence Division. Security Classified Correspondence and Reports, 1917-1941. Record Group 165, United States National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

C) Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918. Supplement 1, The World War, Volume I.Part 1: The Continuation and Conclusion of the War – Participation of the United States. Editor: Joseph V. Fuller. (US Government Printing Office. Washington, DC. 1933.) [Online]

D) Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920Volume II. ‘Memorandum by the Secretary of State. November 7, 1918.’ Document 126. Editors: Cyril Wynne; E. Wilder Spaulding; E. R. Perkins. (US Government Printing Office. Washington, DC. 1940.) [Online]

E) Department of State Records, Record Group 84, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.


1. The literal meaning of armistice is ‘a halt to, or stopping of, the use of arms’ (as in weapons of war).

2. Warburton to War Department. Paris. November 7, 1918. No. 628. File# 2169-38.  Documents Sources B).  Referred to as Document No 398 in Documents Sources C); and in the Lansing Memorandum in Documents Sources D).

See ‘Roy Howard’s Search for Information about the False Armistice’ on this website for details about other false armistice reports allegedly sent to Washington, DC, on 7 November 1918.

3. G-2 (SOS) Report, Section 3. Documents Sources A). The 8:55 am arrival time at the War Department is recorded on the telegram.

4. The “war-time system of quick communication” is mentioned in a 1928 article, about the two false armistice cablegrams to America, in the Madera Daily Tribune and Madera Mercury (California), 7 November 1928, p3, under ‘World War Officials Give Story of How False Report Started’. There are two separate articles on the page but paragraphs from each article evidently became mixed-up during publication, causing some confusion in the narrative.

5. Lansing Memorandum, Documents Sources D). And, Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House). Washington, November 7, 1918, 11 a.m. Document No 398, Documents Sources C). House is sometimes referred to as ‘Colonel’ House, but he had no military service record or official military rank.

6. The Madera Daily Tribune and Madera Mercury (California), 7 November 1928, p3.  See note 4.

House’s reply, “Armistice has not yet been signed. German representatives [have not yet met] Marshal Foch”, reached the State Department at 2:04 pm (7:04 pm in Paris).  It shows the time of “6:00 pm” from Paris, so it seems to have taken about an hour to get to Washington, DC.  House to Secretary of State. Paris, November 7, 1918, 6 p.m. Document 399. Documents Sources C).

7. Warburton to War Department. No. 629Paris. Dated November 7, 1918. Received November 7, 12:25 p.m. File# 2169-39. Documents Sources B).

8. Lansing Memorandum. Documents Sources D).

9. Webb Miller, I Found No Peace. The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent. Chapter IV ‘Premature Armistice’, p83. (Camelot Press, London. Book Club Special Edition. 1937.)

The Americans had taken only a part of Sedan by 7 November, not the entire town.

10. The Madera Daily Tribune and Madera Mercury (California), 7 November 1928, p3.  See note 4.

11. See ‘Roy W. Howard in Brest’ on this website for a detailed examination of what happened in Brest during 7-9 November 1918.

12a) A search carried out for the author in the State Department archives found no references to the London Embassy’s receipt of a false armistice message on 7 November 1918.

12b) For more on events in Britain, see James Smith, ‘Reuters and the False Armistice of 7 November 1918’, in The Baron Archives, 6 April 2017.   And the ‘False Armistice in Britain’ article on this website.

13. Warburton’s false armistice cable was made known in 1933, when the State Department Papers, cited in Documents Sources C), were published. The 7 November 1928 article in the Madera Daily Tribune claimed it was revealing “for the first time the fact that the U.S. military attache communicated … word that the armistice had been signed”. But it does not name Warburton.  Roy Howard named him in his account in Webb Miller (see note 9) where he described Warburton’s message – erroneously – as a “verbatim duplicate” of Captain Jackson’s to Admiral Wilson. (p87)

14. Lansing to Sharp. Washington, November 7, 1918, 4 p.m. Document 400, Documents Sources C).

15. Lansing to House. Washington. November 7, 1918. 4 p.m. Not in Documents Sources C). Quoted here from File# 763.72119/9101a, Documents Sources E).

16. Lansing Memorandum. Documents Sources D).

17. Sharp to Lansing. Paris. November 8, 1918, 4 p.m. File# 763.72119/2514; and Sharp to Lansing. Paris. November 8, 1918, 8 P.M. File# 763.72119/2543. Documents Sources E).  The latter, part two, is also in the published Documents Sources C), as Document 409.

18. House to Lansing. Paris. November 8, 1918, 7 p.m. Recd. 5:10 p.m. File# 763.72119/9100. Documents Sources E). Also in Documents Sources C), as Document 404.

19. Warburton to War Department, No. 629, November 7, 1918. Received November 7, 12:25 p.m. File# 2169-39. Documents Sources B).

20. Churchill to Military Attache, Paris. November 8, 1918. File# 2169-40. Documents Sources B).  No ‘time sent’ indicated.

21. Warburton to War Department. No. 642, Paris. November 8, 1918. Received Nov. 8, 10:40 p.m. File# 2169-41. Documents Sources B).

22. See ‘The G-2 (SOS) Report on the False Armistice News’, on this website.

23. See ‘Roy Howard’s Search for Information about the False Armistice’ on this website for details about these.

24. See ‘Arthur Hornblow’s Information about the Jackson Armistice Telegram’ on this website.

25. See ‘The 7 November Local Cease-Fire Orders and the False Armistice News’ on this website.

26. For a detailed account, see ‘Admiral H. B. Wilson and Roy Howard’s Armistice Cablegram’ on this website.